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Abstract. This symposium poses a provocative question: Should
judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political
branches as a means of giving voice to the "will of the people"? The

inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs
of the politicalbranches-aconnection we argue is frayed, at best, in
the currentpolitical context.
In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of
our political system-ranging from representationaldistortions in
federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan
polarizationand the behavior of elected officials-call into question
whether politicaloutcomes reliably reflect majority preferences.

We then turn to deference. As a normative matter, we argue, the
extent of deference need not turn on the majoritarian nature of
political outcomes. There are many reasonsfor deference-as well as
many reasons to reject deference in favor of more aggressivejudicial
review-that have nothing to do with respect for majority will. Yet
the relationshipbetween deference and majoritarianismmay tell us a
great deal about the balance between the judiciary and the rest of
government. Historically, our roughly majoritariansystem provided
mechanisms that helped keep the judiciary roughly in the
mainstream of public opinion on issues that were salient over time.
There are signs that system may be breakingdown. In the second part
of this Essay we return to the sources of political dysfunction
catalogued earlie and argue that the same forces are leading to an
increasinglypolarized bench, while weakening the tools the peopleacting through theirelected representatives-traditionally
have used
to corralthe judiciary.
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Introduction
Although grateful to have been invited to participate in this
discussion-"Does the 'Will of the People'ActuallyExist?JudicialDeference to
Whom,"-we have been tripping over the assignment itself, because it
seems, at least initially, to be a bit of a non sequitur. We had not understood
that judges exercising the power of judicial review were supposed to be
deferring in any way to the popular will. And for that reason, the first

question we were asked to address-whether such a will exists or is
discoverable-seemed unrelated to the second-whether judges
exercising the power of judicial review should defer to the political

branches.1
Still, a conclusion about deference to the political branches might
follow from a premise about the will of the people, if we were to add
another link to the logical chain: a belief that the outputs of the political
branches track, in some meaningful sense, the preferences of a majority of
the people. It is this, we suspect, our organizers had in mind. If so, they are
not alone. Writing in 1962, Alexander Bickel argued in The Least Dangerous
Branch that judicial review is a "deviant institution" in a democracy for just
these reasons.2
As Bickel saw it, "[t]he root difficulty is that judicial review is a
counter-majoritarian force in our system." 3 Bickel acknowledged "various
ways of sliding over this ineluctable reality," such as when the great Chief
Justice John Marshall "spoke of enforcing, in behalf of 'the people,'"
constitutional limits on government. And Bickel understood that "the
word 'people'" itself was an "abstraction."' Still, he insisted, "when the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of
an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual

1

We understand that many commentators explore the extent to which judicial outcomes

mirror public views, including a recent entry from the New York Times as the Supreme Court wound
its way into the final weeks of its October 2020 Term. Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, The Supreme

Court Aligned with Public Opinion in Most Major Cases This Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/27PA-ZY6Q. One of us, in the book, The Will of the People, discussed how what once
was academic heresy-the notion that judicial review reflected popular opinion as a descriptive
matter-was becoming common wisdom among journalists. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 364-65 (2009). But as the book explains, no one seriously believed it was the

normative job of judges simply to follow popular opinion. See id. at 364-66, 382.
2 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986).

3 Id. at 16.
4 Id.
S Id.
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people of the here and now."6 There it is-the "representatives of the
actual people."7
To be clear, Bickel never suggested, nor has any serious scholar since,
that judges simply should adhere to or enforce the naked popular will. If
that were the case, the judiciary would serve as nothing other than some
better-than-average Gallup Poll. Even if the vision made normative sense,
it's hard to know how the judiciary would do better than the pollsters, who
are having their own problems these days.'
Rather, for Bickel, the challenge was to identify a role for judges that
would justify their overturning the otherwise lawful decisions of
institutional decisionmakers: legislators and executive officials.' Why was
it acceptable for judges to impose their own judgments about the
Constitution over the conclusions reached (on constitutional grounds) by
those lawfully empowered in our democracy to make law? That was the
question Bickel set out to solve, and many scholars since have followed in
his footsteps.10
Nonetheless, Bickel did hold to a fairly robust view that the political
branches were tenable proxies for majority sentiment, and in this sense
trumping their decisions was "counter-majoritarian."" It's a bit
remarkable that, writing in the early 1960s, he was obsessed with the
problem that the political branches were majoritarian, but the courts were
not. It's old hat that the Framers didn't write the Constitution in a way
designed to make the political branches mere trumpets for public
preferences. Quite the contrary, many familiar institutions of American
democracy were created to dampen the influence of such preferences,
prominent among them bicameralism and the apportionment of the
Senate." Nor were the political branches particularly good proxies for
popular views in the 1960s. Among other things, the House of
Representatives was horribly malapportioned, something the Supreme

6 Id. at 16-17.
7 Id. at 17.

8 See, e.g., Dan Balz, 2020 PresidentialPolls Suffered Worst Performance in Decades, Report Says,
WASH. POST (July 18, 2021, 11:59 PM), https://perma.cc/7P2-629J (finding that polls in the 2020
presidential election were the most erroneous in forty years, importantly underestimating support for
Donald Trump).

9 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 19-23.
10 See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (noting discussions in academia
regarding the "exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges in ... a
political democracy").
11 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16-19.
12 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 15-20 (2d ed.
2003) (highlighting seven undemocratic features of the Constitution).
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Court aimed to fix (which Bickel, ironically, opposed) in Wesberry v.
Sanders.3 Finally, Bickel had a sophisticated understanding of the political
science of his day, which was taken up with discussions of the influence of
"pressure groups," and various other types of legislative dysfunction that
might defeat majoritarianism." Despite all this, he fell back on the
importance of the electoral process." "[1]t remains true nevertheless,"
Bickel insisted stubbornly, "that only those minorities rule which can
command the votes of a majority of individuals in the legislature who can
command the votes of a majority of individuals in the electorate." 16
Whatever was true in 1962, it seems notably less true today that the
political branches ought to be seen as close proxies for popular opinion.
That is the point we make in Part 1 of this Essay, highlighting widespread
dysfunction in our current political system that calls into question
whether political outcomes mirror majority will in any meaningful way.
In Part 11, we turn to deference. If we're right that political decisionmaking cannot easily be equated with the will of the people, does it follow
that deference becomes less relevant, or that more aggressive judicial
review is warranted? We think not.
As a normative matter, the extent of deference need not have any
relationship to the majoritarian nature of political outcomes. On the one
hand, there are many reasons for deference-as well as many reasons to
reject deference in favor of more aggressive judicial review-that have
nothing to do with respect for majority will. On the other hand, the
relationship between deference and majoritarianism may tell us a great
deal about the balance between the judiciary and the rest of government.
Historically, our roughly majoritarian system provided mechanisms that
helped keep the judiciary roughly in the mainstream, on the issues that
were salient over time. There are signs that the system may be breaking

down. The same sort of political dysfunction described in Part I is leading
to an increasingly polarized bench, while breaking down the tools the

13 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (requiring congressional districts to have roughly equal populations). At
the time of Wesberry, in all but five states the difference in population between the largest
congressional district and the smallest was greater than 100,000.

Id. at 21 (Harlan, J.,

dissenting). Yet,

Bickel was critical of proportional representation and particularly the Supreme Court's ruling in Baker
v. Carr. See Alexander M. Bickel, Reapportionment & LiberalMyths, COMMENTARY, June 1963, at 483,
489-90 (challenging the idea that proportional representation is feasible or even desirable).
14 See, e.g., BiCKEL, supra note 2, at 18-19 (discussing the role of interest groups in the political
system).
SId. at 19.
16 Id. Bickel likewise was unconcerned that many decisionmakers in our democracy, from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Federal Reserve to quotidian administrative officials, were themselves not
electorally accountable: "For admirals and generals and the like are most often responsible to officials
who are themselves elected and through whom the line runs directly to a majority." Id.
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people traditionally have used to corral the judiciary. This should give
pause to anyone concerned about the long term health of our tripartite
system.
1.

The Will of the People?

Let's assume the people have a "will" on at least some sizeable subset
of constitutional questions, which we could identify if we could look into
the hearts and minds of the American public." The question we want to
explore is whether such a popular will (i.e., preferences shared by a
majority of people) is reflected reliably in the work of the political
branches. Bickel's optimistic answer to that question was penned at a time
that, to the modern eye, looks like a remarkable period of bipartisanship,
running roughly from the end of World War 11 to the 1980s." Today's
politics, by contrast, are marked by what some have termed
"hyperpartisanship": not only are elected officials from the two major
parties "more ideologically polarized than they have been in over a
century," but "when they engage in legislative redistricting and other
forms of election law, Democrats and Republicans regularly rig the rules
of the game in their favor and gouge the other party in outrageo'us
fashion."" Whatever was the case for legislative majoritarianism in Bickel's
day, we think modern political realities cast serious doubt on any claim
that the outputs of the political branches track, by and large, the will of
the people.
To begin with, there is the problem that our legislatures-both federal
and state-often fail to reflect the bare minimum requirement of
majoritarianism (i.e., that "[t]he party with the most votes wins")." This is
not entirely new. As noted above, low-population states hold an advantage
in the Senate, not by chance but by constitutional design. Someone who
lives in Wyoming (population approximately 580,000) is represented by
the same number of senators as someone who lives in California

17 This obviously is a stylized assumption, and other contributions to this Symposium rightly
question it. The more complex matters of legislation become, the less likely a discernible popular "will"
is to exist. In many cases, the details will be beyond the ken of all but the most informed; even if the
topic of legislation is accessible, opinion will fracture in the face of many choices. Still, once issues
become a matter of controversy, discussions tend to become polarized and binary. That certainly is
the form many Supreme Court decisions take on. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing how
the will of the people can be discerned, particularly retrospectively).

18 See Michael S. Kang, HyperpartisanGerrymandering,61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1381-82 (2020).
19

Id.

20 Steven Levitsky

& Daniel Ziblatt, End Minority Rule,

https://perma.cc/4A8P-HL5B.

N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,

2020),
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(population approximately 39.5 million).2 ' Low-population states are
overrepresented in the Electoral College as well, thanks to the fact that
each state gets at least three electors: each of Wyoming's three electors
represents roughly 195,000 people, whereas California's fifty-four electors
speak for approximately 732,000 people each.22
What is new is our political geography, in which the urban-rural
divide increasingly maps the division between the two major parties,
translating into a significant Republican advantage in both the Senate and
the Electoral College. Republicans won more votes than Democrats in
only four of the fifteen Senate races from 1990 to 2018 but held a majority
of seats in nine.23 During the same period, two Republican presidents
(George W. Bush and Donald Trump) prevailed in the Electoral College
despite losing the popular vote."
More surprising is that the same political geography translates into
representational distortions in the U.S. House of Representatives and
many state legislatures-bodies whose members are selected from single
districts rather than statewide tallies. Since the reapportionment
decisions of the 1960s, districting is supposed to equalize population
differentials, with each district containing roughly the same number of
voters.25 Yet single-member districts nevertheless can produce minority
rule if co-partisans are concentrated in ways that transform statewide

majorities into minorities in most districts. Today's urban-rural
polarization increasingly produces precisely those patterns-which then
are magnified in many states by partisan gerrymandering.26 The upshot is
that the party that wins a majority of votes may remain a minority in

21

Quick Facts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/PLH8-8VLH

(providing

population statistics for California following the 2020 Census); QuickFacts: Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://perma.cc/Y2PB-TFM7 (providing population statistics for Wyoming following the

2020 Census).
22 Denise Lu, The Electoral College Misrepresents Every State, but Not as Much as You May Think,
(noting such data based on prior

WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/9WL4-MWPE

population and elector statistics); see also Katy Collin, The ElectoralCollege Badly Distorts the Vote. And
It's Going to Get Worse, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/UC3L-LRRT (calculating that
each Wyoman's vote weighs 3.6 times that of each Californian). The number of electors representing
California was reduced by one pursuant to the 2020 Census, whereas the number of electors
representing Wyoming was unchanged. E.g., Mike Schneider, Winners and Losers from First Release of

2020 Census Data, AP NEwS (Apr. 26, 2021, 4:50 PM), https://perma.cc/MY96-6ZW2.
23 JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL

DIVIDE 1-2 (2019).
24 Dave Roos, S PresidentsWho Lost the PopularVote but Won the Election, HISTORY (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Dv47-EA4W.
25 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5, 7, 10-11 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192, 197
(1962).
26 See RODDEN, supra note 23, at 2-4.
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Congress, as was true for Democrats in the House after the 1996 and 2012
elections." Minority rule is even more pronounced in state legislatures:
between 1968 and 2016, there have been 146 minoritarian outcomes in
state senates and 121 in state houses.28
These electoral systems affect not only who is elected, but also how
those in office exercise their power. The use of single-member districts
"tend[s] to produce what the literature calls a 'winner's bonus,'"
disproportionately exaggerating the size of the winning coalition beyond
what a system of proportional representation would produce. 29 Add in
geographical clustering and/or gerrymandering, and the bonus can be
inflated significantly. That is, if voters from one party are packed into
certain districts, the other party may win a narrow majority of votes
statewide but prevail in a far greater proportion of districts, ending up
with "very large legislative supermajorities."30 And "[l]egislators with such
artificial cushions may be less responsive to the concerns of both the
median voter and of partisan minorities.""
Extraordinarily high rates of political polarization in state and federal
legislatures provide additional reasons to doubt that legislative outputs
will reflect majority preferences reliably. Polarization can be understood
in a variety of ways, but two important measures are partisansorting and
ideological divergence.32 Partisan sorting involves a tighter association
between ideology and party identification, typically measured by the
degree of overlap between the most conservative Democrats and the most
liberal Republicans." Where in the Congress there once was considerable
overlap between members of the parties on ideology, today there is none.34
27 Id. at 1-3.
28 Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REv. 1733, 1764 (2021)
(defining "minoritarian outcomes" as scenarios in which "the party controlling the chamber did not
receive the most votes" (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 1765 ("[T]he election results after the 2018
election alone were such that 'nearly 60 million Americans live under minority rule in their U.S. state
legislatures.'" (quoting CHRISTIAN R. GROSE, JORDAN CARR PETERSON, MATTHEW NELSON & SARA
SADHWANI,

THE

WORST

PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS

IN U.S.

STATE

LEGISLATURES

6 (2019),

https://perma.cc/AKG6-68GF)).
29 Id. at 1767.
30 RODDEN, supra note 23, at 184, 184 fig.6.8 (describing such results after recent elections in
several states and noting that "[t]hese legislative outcomes" of "supermajorities on the order of 65
percent or more ... are well beyond the typical winner's bonus").
31 Seifter, supra note 28, at 1762.

32 Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115
COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1694 (2015) (emphasis added in part).
33 Id. at 1694-95.
34 See Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarizationof ContemporaryAmerican Politics, 46
POLITY 411, 416 fig.1 (2014) (showing ideological dispersion of the parties in Congress from 18792013); see also Andrew Prokop, See Congress Polarizeover the Past 60 Years, in One Beautiful Chart, voX
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Ideological divergence typically is measured by the distance between the

party medians and it, too, has increased dramatically." In short, "[t]he
Democratic and Republican [p]arties are more polarized today than they
have been in decades-maybe more than a century, according to some
measures." 36
Although the causes of polarization are debated hotly, few researchers
view polarization among elected elites as a simple reflection of
polarization in the public at large. Instead, most agree that polarization in
Congress (the focus of most studies) is significantly more pronounced
than polarization among the public. If the people's representatives are
polarized in ways the people themselves are not, "then Congress may not
reflect the underlying views it is supposed to represent."" Polarization, on

this view, is contributing to a "[d]isconnect" between voters and elected
officials, a "[b]reakdown in [r]epresentation." 5
Like the electoral systems sketched above, polarization has
consequences both for the makeup of federal and state legislatures and for
how those institutions operate. Although the direction of the causal arrow
is hard to pin down, it is clear that today's high rates of polarization
coincide with pronounced "'team play' behavior-the will to win and
desire to beat the other party," and the refusal to break rank with one's
own party and engage in bipartisan compromise. 39 In periods of unified
(Oct. 27, 2015, 10:06 AM), https://perma.cc/B4Z3-8MLU (charting the considerable increase, since
1949, in the likelihood that House Democrats and Republicans will vote with their own party).

35 See Jeff Lewis, Polarizationin Congress,VOTEVIEW.COM (June 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/SDADUH9V (showing party means on the liberal-conservative dimension over time, by chamber); Parties:
PartiesOverview, VOTEVIEW.COM, https://perma.cc/NQ9C-HTSJ (plotting party median idology from
1800 to present).

36 Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization,97
TEx. L. REv. 43, 51-52 (2018) (citing Hare & Poole, supra note 34, at 411-13).
3 Seth J. Hill & Chris Tausanovich, A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in
Congressionaland Public Polarization,77 J. POL. 1058, 1059 (2015); see also Michael J. Barber & Nolan
McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
AMERICA 15, 24 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) ("The emerging consensus is that most voters have and
remain overwhelmingly moderate in their policy positions.").

38 See MORRIS P. FlORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS, DISCONNECT: THE BREAKDOWN OF
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2009). But cf Hill & Tausanovich, supra note 37, at 1060

REPRESENTATION

(arguing that senators have long been "unrepresentative of most of their constituents").
39 Farina, supra note 32, at 1700 (quoting FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS,
PRINCIPLES, AND PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE 71-73 (2009)); Nolan McCarty, What We Know and

Don't Know About Our PolarizedPolitics,WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/PSAY-EKNF ("The
combination of high ideological stakes and intense competition for party control of the national
government has all but eliminated the incentives for significant bipartisan cooperation on important

national problems."); cf Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of
MajoritarianLawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261,286-87(2013) (describing changes
in Congress that "paved the way for increases in party discipline").
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government, polarization and team play are likely to produce legislation
that is ideologically extreme.4 0 Importantly for present purposes, research
indicates that such legislation may well "overshoot" the preferences of
many of the majority party's own constituents"
But when government is divided, the probable consequence of
polarization plus team play is gridlock.42 As political scientists Michael
Barber and Nolan McCarty have explained, "[i]ncreased policy differences
shrink the set of compromises that both parties are willing to entertain,"
while simultaneously exacerbating "the incentives to engage in
brinkmanship in bargaining and negotiation, thereby endangering even
the feasible compromises.""
Gridlock is common today even under unified government, thanks to
how polarization and party discipline interact with various features of the
legislative process that require supermajority consensus-most notably,
the filibuster in the Senate. The filibuster allows the minority party to
block proposed legislation by engaging in extended debate, which (under
current rules) can be ended only by a vote for cloture by at least sixty
senators." The filibuster is not new-the Senate's rules have permitted
unlimited debate since the early 1800s-but it has changed.45 Historically,
filibustering Senators actually spoke on the floor of the Senate, and no
other work could proceed while a filibuster was ongoing.46 In 1972,
however, the Senate moved to a "two-track" system that permits Senators
to filibuster, while the chamber considers other business.4 7 And filibusters
today are often "silent"-that is, objecting senators do not have to speak
for hours on end but simply can "tell[] the leadership that 41 senators

40 See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, America's Missing Moderates: Hiding in PlainSight, AM. iNT. (Feb.
12,
2013), https://perma.cc/L58P-CYX9 (discussing excesses by both parties during recent periods of
unified government).
41 See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, supra note 37, at 24 ("In studies that produce estimates of voterissue positions that are comparable to legislator positions, representatives were found to take
positions that are considerably more extreme than those of their constituents." (first citing Joshua D.

Clinton, Representation in Congress:Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House, 68 J. POL. 397 (2006);
&

and then citing Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study
of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 519 (2010))); Jeffrey R. Lax

Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM.

J. POL. SCL 148,

164 (2012) (finding that

"states tend to 'overshoot' relative to the median voter's specific policy preferences").
42 Lemos & Young, supra note 36, at 53.
43 Barber & McCarty, supra note 37, at 40.

44

Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 182, 184 (1997).

45 See generally id. at 187-209 (discussing history and evolution of the filibuster).
46 See id. at 201.
47 id.
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won't vote for a bill."" The consequence has been a steep increase in the

use of the filibuster. In 1962, when Bickel published The Least Dangerous
Branch, the Senate logged four motions to invoke cloture and end debate;
in 2020, that number was 328.49 Today we have a Senate in which the de
facto threshold for legislation now stands at 60 votes-"[a] Senate, in
other words, where minorities reign.""
Gridlock may thwart popular preferences in various ways, includingmost obviously-by giving the people stasis when they want change." But
policy making doesn't simply stop during periods of divided government;
instead, political outputs tend to be reshaped and redirected into different
channels. In the Senate, for example, legislators increasingly use
reconciliation processes to sidestep the filibuster." Reconciliation was
created by the Budget Act of 1974 as a way of fast-tracking measures that
would reconcile long-term spending programs with the goals of the
annual budget and appropriations process.53 Originally designed "as a
modest tool that would align legislation with revenue and spending
targets set forth in the budget resolution, [reconciliation] has since risen
in importance." 4 Writing in 2013, Tonja Jacobi and Jeff VanDam observed

48 Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, A One-Track Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2010),
https://perma.cc/3463-7AH4; see also Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence & Steven S. Smith, Tracking
the Filibuster,1917 to 1996,30 AM. POL. RSCH. 406,411-12 (2002) (explaining how two-track system and
"silent" rather than "talking" filibuster decrease the costs of filibustering for the minority).
49 Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, https://perma.cc/9KMS-JK7T. To be fair, low rates of cloture in
Bickel's time and before may have had to do with aversion to cloture as well as the relative rarity of
the filibuster. See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 39, at 275 (noting senators' unwillingness to invoke
cloture prior to the 1970s, while emphasizing that "it must also be said that majorities regularly passed
legislation in this era; it had simply not come to pass yet that every bill had the threat of a filibuster
hanging over it, as is the case today, and thus every bill did not have to acquire 60 votes to pass").
50 Jacobi & vanDam, supra note 39, at 278; see also Ezra Klein, Let's Talk: The Move to Reform the
Filibuster, NEW YORKER (Jan. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/6K4W-DNJ2 ("[Jiust about all matters,
controversial or not, require a three-fifths majority.").
51 Barber & McCarty, supra note 37, at 41, 45 ("The most direct effect of polarization-induced
gridlock is that public policy does not adjust to changing economic and demographic circumstances.").
52 See 2 U.S.C. J 641(e)(2) (providing that debate on reconciliation bills is capped by statute
at
twenty hours).
53 MEGAN

S. LYNCH & JOHN v. SATURNO, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,

R44058, THE BUDGET

RECONCILIATIONS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 1 (2021) ("The purpose of reconciliation process is to
allow Congress to use an expedited procedure when considering legislation that would bring existing
spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the

annual budget resolution."); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY & JOSH CHAFETZ, 2021
SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2-3 (6th ed. Supp. 2021) (offering a concise overview of reconciliation and
its effects on process and policy).

54
(2020).

Rebecca M. Kysar, The New Tax Legislative and Regulatory Process, 73 NAT'L TAX

J.

1135, 1137
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that "[m]any of the major legislative battles of the previous decade
involved reconciliation bills in a central role, including, notably, President
George W. Bush's tax cuts and President Barack Obama's health care
reform."" Eight years later, we can add the massive 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act to that list."6 Like other forms of what Barbara Sinclair dubbed
"unorthodox lawmaking," reconciliation offers a means of breaking the
logjam-but it does so by bypassing congressional committees and other
important procedural sites for input, debate, and compromise."
Gridlock in Congress also means more matters are left to "an everincreasing array of states, agencies, private actors, and quasi-private
actors."" Little about that list screams "will of the people." States, as
described above, are prey to the same political pathologies that affect the
legislative process.59 Administrative agencies, for their part, have inspired
mountains of scholarship wrestling with the "serious legitimacy problem"
presented by lawmaking by unelected bureaucrats.' And administrative
law is replete with doctrines designed to ensure that agencies are sites for
"reasoned decision-making"; an agency that defended a new regulatory
policy on the ground that it tracks majority preferences would likely meet
a swift rebuke in court. 61
55 Jacobi & vanDam, supra note 39, at 264.
56 Kysar, supra note 54, at 1138-44 (describing reconciliation and enactment of the Tax Cuts and

Jobs Act).
57 BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.

CONGRESS 264 (5th ed. 2016); Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting by the Rules, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1141
(2021) ("The rushed [reconciliation] process sometimes results in less-than-perfect legislation; to put
it charitably."). On the prevalence of unorthodox lawmaking in the current Congress and its effects,
see Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1812-13 (2015); and also see Barber & McCarty, supranote 37, at
47-48 (summarizing "studies ...

argu[ing] that polarization has altered Congress's deliberative and

policy-making procedures and capacities").
58 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH CHAFETZ, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 89 (6th ed. 2020) (describing "[m]assive and [v]ariegated [d]elegation" under the "new
normal" of hyperpartisan polarization).
59 See Seifter, supranote 28, at 1762; see also supranotes 26-43 and accompanying text.
Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning
Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 580-89 (2011) (summarizing literature and
questioning whether oversight of agencies by Congress or the President creates meaningful
6

democratic accountability); see also Miriam Seifter, Further From the People? The Puzzle of State
Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107,110-13 (2018) (critiquing assumption that state agencies are more
attentive and responsive to the public's needs).
61 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Placefor Politics in Arbitrary and CapriciousReview, 119 YALE
L.J. 2, 5-6,16 (2009) ("[A]gencies, courts, and scholars alike generally seem to have accepted the view
that influences coming from one political branch or another cannot be allowed to explain
administrative decisionmaking... ."). On the intriguing question of what role politics may play when

George Mason Law Review

498

[Vol. 29:2

There's much more we could say here about the failure of political
outputs to reflect majority views. We could talk about the realities of
modern campaign finance, burgeoning voter-suppression efforts in the
states, and much more. But we believe the basic point is plain enough: if
representation in the political branches supplies the logical link between

the will of the people and the question of deference to the legislative and
executive outputs, the link is-at best-frayed. And that seems a very
generous assessment.
11.

Deference and Judicial Review

Which brings us to the question at the heart of this symposium:
whether deference is due the decisions of the political branches. If political
outcomes do not reliably reflect majoritarian preferences, is there any
reason for judges to defer to what politics renders? Or should judges
abandon deference altogether?
In this Part, we argue that this conclusion-that deference is
unnecessary if institutional outcomes are not majoritarian-is too quick.
Put simply, there are many reasons for and against judicial deference that
have nothing to do with majority will. Yet majoritarianism does matter to
the functioning of judicial review. The reason rests not in normativity and
law, but in a historical and social-scientific understanding of how majority
will and judicial will interact. Rather than thinking solely about whether

judicial review thwarts majoritarianism, it is important to understand that
majoritarianism has served as a check on judicial review over the ages.6 2 In

modern times, majority will and judicial review have been in equilibrium.
But dysfunction in the political branches is breeding similar dysfunction
in the judiciary, and there is a risk that the equilibrium will collapse. If so,
as we explain, dysfunction may have the effect of causing action to be
taken against the judiciary; or it may leave the judiciary out of sync with
the public, with the political branches unable to respond.
A.

Deference and Majority Will

The question of how judges should review the decisions of other
institutional actors is a complicated one (to put it mildly) that has
generated vast literatures. Some theories hold that judges should defer to
the constitutional judgments of the political branches; others seek to
justify non-deferential review of political outputs. Despite their many

the administrative agency resolving a matter is actually a city council or other legislative body, see

generally Maria Ponomarenko, Legislative Administration, 2021 Wis. L. REV. 1231.
62 For a broader discussion of this phenomenon, see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 370.
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differences, theories of judicial review-deferential or not-share two
features that are key for our purposes. First, they are normative, focusing
on how judges ought to act vis-a-vis the political branches. Second, many
theories of judicial review have little, if anything, to do with whether the
outputs in question reflect majority will. Some do, but it seems safe to say
that there is no necessary connection between deference (or lack thereof)
and majoritarianism.
Take theories of deference. Some of these turn on the notion that
there are better and less good ways of finding answers to complicated
policy questions, and deference is due the former. For example, if extrajudicial entities have superior fact-finding capabilities or other epistemic
63
advantages, that may be a reason to defer to outcomes they render. The
capacity to speak with one voice, rather than a cacophony, may be another
reason for deference-as in the context of executive action on foreign
affairs." In other cases, there simply may not be a right or clear answer to
some questions, and absent a clear constitutional answer, it may be better
to leave legislative or executive settlements undisturbed. This was the
view of James Bradley Thayer, or at least part of the reasoning for his
position that judicial review should not trump the determinations of the
political branches-whose decisions will "accomplish results throughout
the country of the profoundest importance before any judicial question
can arise or be decided"-absent "clear" error.6S
By the same token, it hardly is the case that theories that seek to
justify non-deferential judicial review of political outputs necessarily turn
on whether an outcome is majoritarian. Indeed, most theories of judicial
review-that is, about whether and how judges should invalidate the
enactments of political actors-are to the contrary. The point holds even
63 See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169,1171(2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court should defer to congressional
factfinding when Congress has comparative institutional strengths). See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLiCY (1994)

(arguing that legal reforms are more effective when done through institutions with comparative
institutional advantage); Eric A. Posner & Adrian vermeule, The Votes of Other]udges,105 GEO. L.J. 159,
166 (2016) (arguing that "epistemic humility" should encourage judges to defer to administrative
agencies).
6 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1100-01
(2008) (noting "super-strong deference to executive department interpretations in matters of foreign
affairs and national security"); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 17 (2015) (noting that for
international diplomacy to be effective, the President must be able to speak for the Nation as a whole);

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319-21 (1936) (noting that the unique status
of the President as a single individual makes international relations his "plenary and exclusive power").
65 James B. Thayer, The Originand Scope of the American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129.135-36.144(1893).
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for Bickel. He started with the countermajoritarian problem, but his
ultimate answer was that courts were forums of "principle," serving as
"republican schoolmaster[s]" for the rest of the nation." (Suffice to say his

)

answer hardly solved his own dilemma."7

Then there's originalism, which is the antithesis of majoritarianism.
Originalism holds that judges are to hew to the [insert your favorite flavor
of] the original meaning of the Constitution." In its purest form, one
supposes deference to the political branches is not part of the equation at
all-indeed it might be heresy if those branches are treading upon the
original Constitution. Steven Calabresi makes this clear in an essay
rejecting James Bradley Thayer's "clear mistake" rule.69 As Calabresi puts it,
"the Supreme Court ought to decide constitutional cases in accord with
the original public meaning of the relevant text as it applies to the

circumstances of our modern world."" For that reason, it would be
"unconstitutional for the Supreme Court to erase constitutional rights
that actually are in the Constitution, and that is what the adoption of
Thayerian reasoning [i.e., deference] would lead to.""
Even one of the theories of judicial review most attentive to fostering
majoritarian politics still does not tell judges to defer to majoritarian
outcomes. For John Hart Ely, representation reinforcement was the order
of the day.' Putting it (too) crisply, courts were to do two things. One was

to scrutinize closely political decisions that disadvantaged "discrete and
insular" minorities (i.e., those who could not find protection in the

66 BICKEL, supra note 2, at 26; Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967
SUP. CT. REv.127,128,156,180 (arguing that the role of the Supreme Court has been to teach the public
about the "manners, morals, and beliefs that sustain republican government"); see also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreward:The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 49-50 (1961)
(discussing the Supreme Court's role as a body of neutral principle rather than political expediency).

67 See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1567-68
(1985) (noting that many scholars disagree with Bickel, and that "[i]n the decade [following] his death,
constitutional theory ... turned away from the ideas that Bickel championed").
68 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The GravitationalForce of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411,412
(2013) (contrasting "new" originalism, which is about original public meaning, with "old" originalism,
which is about the Framers' intent). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The

Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12,12-41 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (providing
a background of originalism, its history, and its differing strains).

69 Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism and James Bradley Thayer, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. 1419, 1420-21
(2019).
70 Id. at 1421.
71 Id.

72 John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode ofJudicialReview, 37
MD. L. REv. 451,
469-71(1978).
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political process because of built-in bias)." The other was to "[c]lear[] the
[c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange," which is to say, facilitate democratic
governance.74 And what Ely often wanted to facilitate was
majoritarianism. Thus, whereas Bickel disagreed with the Supreme Court
entering "the political thicket" in the reapportionment cases, for Ely this
was precisely what the Court should be doing: fostering a vibrant
majoritarianism.7 5 That's different, though, from striking or upholding
decisions based simply on whether they are majoritarian. It's hard to see
Ely cottoning to that.
We don't purport to offer anything like a comprehensive survey of
theories of judicial review, but the point by now should be clear:
majoritarianism qua majoritarianism is hardly a central part of the theory
of how judicial review should operate. Rather, it was a frame for various
theories of judicial review in the post-New Deal era. Legal scholars became
"obsessed" with the majoritarian problem beginning around Bickel's time,
for reasons that were historically contingent. Progressives had attacked
the courts in the first part of the twentieth century for striking down
popular enactments designed to regulate market failures.76 After Franklin
Roosevelt had the opportunity to remake the Supreme Court, the justices
eschewed challenging economic legislation but slowly started to strike
down other sorts of laws denying the safeguards of the Bill of Rights."
Liberals thus faced a dilemma: how could they like judicial review in the
latter instance, while having deplored it in the former? This was the root
of Bickel's countermajoritarian problem and that of the liberal academy
that followed him. (It was not a problem that much concerned
conservatives, although they too have deployed the countermajoritarian
concern strategically at times.") The countermajoritarian difficulty is a
jumping-off point for theories of judicial review, not a theory in and of

7 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 151-52 (1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153

n.4 (1938)).
74 Id. at 105-34.
75

BICKEL, supra note 2, at 190-98 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)); ELY,

supra note 73, at 116-25.
76 See, e.g., Keith E.

Whittington,

Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 829

(2005) (noting this criticism).

77

Compare, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955) (upholding

an economic regulation that could be rationally related to legitimate legislative purpose), with, e.g.,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1960) (overturning state action that violated petitioner's
Fifteenth Amendment right).
78 See, e.g., Josh Hawley, Why I Won't Stop Asking Judicial Nominees If They Will Follow the
Constitution, FEDERALIST (Feb. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/US2B-FSY6 (criticizing activist judges who
"invent new 'implied rights' out of thin air and usurp the will of We the People").
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itself. And it has not been a core of the most prominent theories of judicial
review.

B.

JudicialReview and Majority Will

All that said, there is a view of judicial review that sees a relationship
between majority will and judicial review. One of us wrote a book about it
(entitled The Will of the People), and both of us were co-authors on a
casebook (JudicialDecision-Making:A Coursebook) that explores the matter
at length.9 That theory, however, is descriptive-not normative. It
suggests how judicial review in fact operates, rather than prescribing how
judges should exercise the power of judicial review.
The descriptive theory of the relationship between judicial review and
the popular will is that over time, on salient issues, the judiciary tends to
come into line with public opinion.80 Note all the caveats. It's over time,
not immediately. It is salient issues, not all of them. And, although the
theorytends to suggest that the judiciary comes into line with prevailing
views, there is some evidence that the judiciary affects popular views as
well. The direction of the causal arrow is not entirely clear.
Although this is a descriptive and not a normative theory, it contains
a seed of concern for a judiciary that ignores the theory's fundamental
insight. The theory was intended as a partial response to Bickel's supposed
countermajoritarian problem: on the issues that mattered, over time, the
judiciary did not in fact trump the will of the people. So, everyone who
worried over the countermajoritarian difficulty simply could relax a bit.
But the flip side of the insight-that the judiciary is not often out of
line with the public in the long run-is that there is peril if it gets out of
line. Time and again since the founding of the Republic, judges have paid
a price when they have defied the popular will. "Americans have abolished

courts, impeached one justice, regularly defied Court orders, packed the
Court, and stripped its jurisdiction."" The point is that the public-and
more aptly the political branches-has not lacked for tools to discipline a

judiciary that had no care for the deeper mores of the American people, as
represented by deep public opinion over time.
The extent of peril the judiciary has faced itself has been historically
contingent. Modern times have seen fewer attacks and even fewer
successful ones. Of course, it is impossible to tell if that is because the

79 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; BARRY FRIEDMAN, MARGARET H. LEMOS, ANDREW D.
MARTIN, TOM S. CLARK, ALLISON ORR LARSEN & ANNA HARVEY, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: A
COURSEBOOK ch. 10 (2020).
80 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 14-15, 267-68.
81 Id. at 375; see also FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 704-20.
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political weapons have lost their luster, or if the judges have been attentive
to the threat of discipline. Even if an aroused public wants the Court's
head on a platter, political actors-such as our countermajoritarian
Senate-can protect it from any measures that require legislative assent.
There is a deep respect for the judiciary, so deep that even at a time of
great anger with the judiciary, Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan
failed.82 (Of course, the Court also acceded to popular views, and had it
not, the outcome may have been different.83
We discuss all of this because what is discernible, and concerning, is
that the political dysfunction described in Part 1 is having its impact on
the judiciary. To put the point sharply, not only is the judiciary not
immune to ideological partisanship, but the increased partisanship and
non-majoritarian nature of politics may be driving the judiciary in the
same direction. And should that get out of hand, the judiciary may well
find itself in trouble. Or, perhaps worse, the judiciary may deserve to be
checked but avoid reform because the political branches are unable to act.
Once the system falls out of equilibrium, it's difficult to say what the result
might be, but historically it has not been good.
1.

A Broken Selection Process Leads to a More Extreme Bench'

Let's start with a broken selection process. It is hardly a new insight
that over the last few decades the process for choosing federal judges has
gone off the rails. What used to be a fairly quiet and deferential affair,
certainly for courts other than the Supreme Court, has become highly
contentious and partisan.84 There's a battle royale over what constitutes
the original sin, and both parties have a list of grievances about the other
as long as a freight train.85 There's no point in adjudicating who's right.
The result is a nasty game of tit for tat.
What's notable is how this mirrors what happens generally in
Congress in these partisan times. During times of divided government
(and here what matters is party division between the presidency and the

82 See William E. Leuchtenburg, When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme Court-and
Lost, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 2005), https://perma.cc/P9UE-JVU9 (noting that despite a large
Democratic majority and anger at the judiciary, many feared that court packing would undermine the
Court's institutional independence).
83 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 196, 236.
84 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship,Norms, and FederalJudicialAppointments, 16 GEO.

J.L. & PUB. POLY 521,

521 (2018).
85 See Jonathan H. Adler, On JudicialConfirmations-Historyand Numbers, vOLOKH CONSPIRACY

(Mar. 13, 2013, 11:38 PM), https://perma.cc/2U4C-2KMV ('The reality, however, is that there are no
clean hands in these fights any more.").
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Senate), there are signs fewer judges will be appointed at all.86 Both parties
have figured out how to slow down confirming judges that are nominated
by the opposing party.87 The highest profile example of this is how the
nomination of Merrick Garland languished, but the same phenomenon is
true of nominees to the lower courts.88 Commentators suggest that, taken
to an extreme, one party simply could stop confirming almost any
judges.8 9 This in part is because, in highly polarized times, even individuals
previously deemed moderate will be seen as players for the other team.

But the greater motivation is to save the seats in the hope that in the next
cycle your team will get to make the appointments.
Again, matters look different under unified government, when the
President and Senate majority are of the same party. We saw above that
hyperpartisanship combined with unified government can produce
extreme policy; in the context of courts, the likely product is extremism in
judicial appointments. Part of the story here involves the decline or
demise of institutional features designed to promote moderation,
including the filibuster (discussed in Part 1) and the so-called "blue slip"
process, which historically gave home-state senators from either party an
effective veto over judicial appointments.9 0 Although the filibuster

continues to stymie regular legislation, the Senate has abandoned it for

86 See David A. Graham, What Happens If Republicans Refuse to ReplaceJustice Scalia?, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/4LXS-BP2C (quoting Senators Burr, Cruz, and McCain expressing
intention to block any justice nominated by Hillary Clinton); see also Ilya Shapiro, The Senate Should

Refuse to Confirm All of Hillary Clinton's Judicial Nominees, FEDERALIST (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://perma.cc/YQ7U-Q8XK.
87 See, e.g., whittington, supra note 84, at 525, 530 (arguing that the modem Senate has
obstructed circuit court nominees at an unprecedented rate, starting during the second half of the
Clinton Presidency through the Trump Presidency); Adler, supra note 85 (chronicling the success both
parties have had delaying and obstructing the confirmation of the other party's nominees, starting
during the Clinton Administration). See generally BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42732,
LENGTH OF TIME FROM NOMINATION TO CONFIRMATION FOR "UNCONTROVERSIAL" U.S. CIRCUIT AND
DISTRICT COURT NOMINEES: DETAILED ANALYSIS (2012) (finding that wait times from nomination to
confirmation have steadily increased from the Reagan Presidency, including for uncontroversial
nominees from both parties).
88 See Russell Wheeler, Senate ObstructionismHandeda Raft ofludicial Vacancies to Trump-What
Has He Done with Them?, BROOKINGS: FixGOv BLOG (June 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/K7DM-6RJH
(finding that the Republican-controlled Senate in the last two years of the Obama Administration
confirmed far fewer lower court judges than its recent other-party predecessors during the Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton Presidencies);
89

See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 84, at 530 (suggesting that during times of divided

government, the Senate increasingly will refuse to seat circuit-court nominees from the opposing
party).
90 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, Where Do Institutions Come From? Exploring the Origins of the Senate

Blue Slip, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 2 (2007).
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judicial appointments, which are now subject to a simple majority vote. 9
Meanwhile, "recent, frequent alteration[s]" to the blue-slip process have
weakened it substantially. 92 With those minority-empowering tools gone,
the party in power can confirm pretty much anyone it wants.9 3
None of this is hypothetical; both dynamics have been on display
during the last decade under the leadership of former Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell.94 McConnell himself has identified judicial
appointments as a "top priority," and there is some evidence he and his
party compatriots rode the Trump coattails in large part for this reason.9
McConnell purposefully engineered a slowdown in confirmations during
the Obama Administration, creating a large number of vacancies for
Trump to fill." And fill them he did: during his one term in office, Trump
filled as many appellate seats as most presidents fill in two, not to speak
of his three appointments to the Supreme Court.9 7

91 See Seung Min Kim, Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Senate GOP Goes 'Nuclear'on Supreme

CourtFilibuster, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://perma.cc/BA3Z-3VVU.
92 Sarah Binder, Dodging the Rules in Trump's Republican Congress, 80 J. POL. 1454, 1455 (2018);
see also Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. TiMES MAG. (Aug.
22, 2018), https://perma.cc/L4Q8-MS93 (describing Senator Grassley's announcement that minorityparty Senators would no longer be able to "wield veto power" over appellate nominees).

93 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular Order, 37 YALE L. & POL'Y REV:INTER
ALIA 1, 23 (2018) (arguing that the blue-slip requirement forced parties to build consensus around their

nominees); Joshua P. Zoffer & David Singh Grewal, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty of a
MajoritarianJudiciary, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 437, 457 (2020) (finding that the demise of the
filibuster has allowed for the confirmation of highly controversial judges who could not have been
confirmed before).
94 To be clear, we are emphatically not saying this is a game only one party plays. Both plainly
do, and we don't want to get lost in a battle of which if either is worse. But we've now got a full account
of the Obama and Trump Presidencies as recent instances of divided and unified government, and
the story for those years is pretty evident.

95 See Susan Davis & Kelsey Snell, Mitch McConnell on Filling the Federal Bench: 'This is My Top
Priority', NPR (May 24, 2019, 7:54 PM), https://perma.cc/6XEZ-9QWD; see also JP Keenan & Ivan
Pereira, For Many White Evangelicals, the Supreme Court Makeup Solidifies Their Supportfor President

Trump, ABC NEwS (Oct. 16, 2020, 6:07 AM), https://perma.cc/SU3R-D2XH; cf 200 Judges: Since 2017,
The Senate Republican Majority Has Confirmed 200 Article 111 Judges, 'A GenerationalRemaking of the
Courts', SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER (June 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/V2N9-Y546 (discussing an
official statement by Senator McConnell about how many judges Trump has nominated and been
confirmed by Senate).
96 When Trump entered office, 9.5 percent of circuit court judgeships and 12.8 percent of
district court judgeships were vacant, compared to 7.3 percent and 5.9 percent when Obama entered
office. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45622, JUDICIAL NOMINATION STATISTICS AND
ANALYSIS: U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS, 1977-2020, at 4-5 (2021).

97 Trump appointed 54 federal appellate court judges during his term, while Presidents Obama
and Bush appointed 55 and 62 judges respectively, over the course of their two terms in office. Chris
Morran, The Government Donald Trump Left Behind, PROPUBLICA

(Jan. 27, 2021, 3:36 PM),
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What's really interesting is the evidence of increased partisanship and
ideological extremism of those appointees. Some of the evidence points in
different directions and it is difficult to arbitrate what is going on. For

example, Trump's nominees garnered far more "no" votes from the
opposing party than is typical, which could suggest those nominees were
more partisan and ideological, or could simply reflect growing partisan
battles generally."' Other evidence is more clear, especially because
supporters of the appointees crowed about it enthusiastically." The
Federalist Society had a huge hand in picking Trump judges, from the
famous pre-election list from which Supreme Court nominees would be
chosen, to the lower courts more generally.100 Republicans, fed up with
disappointment over "stealth" nominees, have chosen judges who were far
more ideologically engaged before their nomination-and a good deal
younger-than had historically been the case. 0' And there is some
indication in the output of those judges that they are holding true to the
increasingly polarized commitments that put them on the bench in the
first place." 2

https://perma.cc/37F2-N9WP. The rush to control the courts has not stopped with Trump. See Mark
Sherman & Darlene Superville, Biden's Judges: More Diverse and More of Them, AP NEWS (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://perma.cc/PG7G-N6WA ("President Joe Biden and Senate Democrats are putting judges on
federal trial and appellate courts at a much faster clip than any of Biden's recent predecessors,
including former President Donald Trump.").
98 Trump appointees have cumulatively received three times more "no" votes than all confirmed
judges in the twentieth century combined. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve Eder & Ben Protess,
A

Conservative Agenda

Unleashed on

the

Federal Courts,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Mar.

16,

2020)

https://perma.cc/ZSWY-M7PV.
99 See, e.g., Jordain Carney, GOPPlays Hardballin Race to Confirm Trump's Court Picks, HILL (Oct.
19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/5ZJL-LL57 (quoting Senator McConnell promising that "[t]he
president is, with our Republican Senate, transforming the American court system").
100 Ginger Gibson & Lawrence Hurley, Trump Identifies 11 Potential Supreme Court Nominees,
REUTERS (May 18, 2016, 2:23 PM), https://perma.cc/5RT7-P8AT; see also Ruiz et al., supra note 98
(finding that all but eight of President Trump's appellate nominees had ties to the Federalist Society,
nearly twice as many as did judges nominated by President Bush).
101 See, e.g., Mairead McArdle, 'No More Secret Moderates':Hawley Doubles Down on Call for Anti-

Roe SCOTUS Nominee, NAT'L REv. (Sept. 22,2020, 11:28 AM), https://perma.cc/V63R-JLKE ("No more
stealth nominees. No more secret moderates. We need a strong, tough conservative, someone who
understands that Roe, for instance, was wrongly decided."); see also Micah Schwartzman & David

Fontana, Trump Picked the Youngest Judges to Sit on the Federal Bench. Your Move, Biden., WASH. POST
(Feb. 16, 2021, 12:33 PM), https://perma.cc/SW9M-RDAN (f'mding that Trump nominees for federal
judgeships were on average forty-seven years old when nominated, five years younger than the
average age of Obama nominees).

102 See generally Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larson, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373,
1380-82,1410,1414-15,1431-36 (2021) (analyzing en banc decisions from the 1960s through 2020 and
finding a dramatic spike in partisan splits and partisan reversals between 2018 and 2020).
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Legislative Stasis Empowers the Judiciary

It's not just the selection process, though, that is leading to
heightened extremism in judicial results; congressional gridlock too is a
contributor. Congressional stasis makes judges all the more important.
First, as noted in Part 1, hyper-partisanship and polarization make it
difficult for Congress to agree on anything. 13 Legislation, when it passes,
has more holes to be filled by judges, or by administrative actors whose
work judges review.
Second, Congress is less able to supervise the judiciary on matters of
statutory interpretation and the like. Outside of the realm of most
constitutional cases, if Congress doesn't like what the judges are doing, it
can override judicial decisions. As other scholars have shown, at other
times in history, this has happened with some frequency."' But if Congress
is at a partisan standoff, then overrides become impossible." This not
only empowers the judiciary-by rendering even statutory decisions
effectively immune to revision by other actors-but also causes those
same decisions to take on the importance generally associated with
constitutional rulings.'
Finally, the very tools that have been used throughout history to curb
the judiciary become almost impossible to wield if Congress cannot agree.
Reforms like court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping require legislation,
and a gridlocked Congress will not be able to deliver it-even if the
reforms enjoy widespread public support. The consequence, once again, is
to liberate the judiciary still further.

103 See, e.g., Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 94-98 (2015)
(finding that even in times of unified government, Congressional deadlock is becoming more
intractable and legislative capacity is reaching new lows).
104 See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1329 (2014) (finding 286
statutes overriding 275 Supreme Court decisions between 1967 and 2011).
105 See id. at 1340-53 (showing that override activity dried up after 1998, when gridlock set in);
Richard L. Hasen, Polarizationand the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 272 (2019) (noting that
during times of increased polarization Congress is more deadlocked and finds it harder to override
court statutory interpretations); see also Neal Devins, Party Polarizationand CongressionalCommittee
Considerationof ConstitutionalQuestions, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 737, 785-86 (2011) (noting that increased
party polarization tends to make it harder to hold constitutional hearings related to Supreme Court
decisions).
106 See, e.g., Tyler Olson, DemocratsRenew Court Packing Calls, Blast the Supreme Court's Final Two
Decisions of Term, Fox NEWS (July 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/CW4R-66DQ (noting that Democrats are
advocating for court packing in response to Supreme Court's interpretation of the voting Rights Act).
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Conclusion
We don't have a crystal ball and won't pretend to know where this all
ends up. The Senate may find a way to break its downward cycle. The
public may adjust to rampant judicial partisanship. Or the judiciary could
get wildly out of sync with the public, and the public could get angry
enough that politics responds in some way. Maybe the political branches
will be too dysfunctional to respond, and the whole system craters. lt's not
like these are optimistic times.
Whatever the case, though, this seems to us the ultimate relationship
of judicial deference and majority will. Majoritarianism is not some

normative lodestar for when judicial review should be exercised. Rather,
it is a key to when the system will be in equilibrium and when it will fall

out. On the one hand, judges should not defer to the political branches or
the public out of sheer majoritarianism. On the other hand, there often
are plenty of other reasons to defer, which vary with the case. Judges
should be attentive to those reasons and thoughtful in the actions they
take. That's what it means to judge, rather than to play on an ideological
or partisan team.

